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Guarding the Subjective Premium:
Condemnation Risk Discounts in the
Housing Market
Sebastien Gay**
Nadia Nasser-Ghodsit
We propose the condemnation risk discount theory, whereby hom e buyers deduct a
discount from housing prices in the absence o f insurance against the risk that the government
will condemn theirproperty for private transfer. H om e owners cannot separate out the negative
risk that their hom e will be condemned horn the positive effect that high-value redevelopment
projects m ay have on the surrounding area. There are, consequently, competing effects o f the
risk ofem inent domain on fair market value.
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I.

Introduction

Michael Cristofaro’s family had two homes condemned by the
city of New London, Connecticut, as part of the 2000 Fort Trumbull
Municipal Development Plan. The project included plans to build new
housing, a hotel, a restaurant, conference and athletic centers, and a
bioscience office park in the Thames River shoreline area.1 When
recently interviewed about his experience, Cristofaro insisted: “It
wasn’t about money.. . . This was our home.”2 He explained that he
and the other property owners who refused to sell their homes were
treated as if they were stonewalling economic development.3 The
dispute was ultimately resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
the infamous Kelo v. City o f N ew London decision, which upheld the
city’s redevelopment plan as a valid taking under the Fifth
Amendment.4 In the aftermath of the ruling, the city has struggled to
get the redevelopment project off the ground.5 Despite the developer’s
promise to build rental units with “Greek Revival and Italianate
facades and interiors with a Japanese contemporary flair,”6the city and
the developer are headed to mediation—thirteen years later—to
resolve financing problems.7 For now, the residents of New London
only see an empty site and hear about future plans.8
Cristofaro takes solace in the fact that the city of New London’s
saga motivated home owners around the country to fight against
eminent domain. ‘“ [Tjhey got off their couches and did something,’ he
said. ‘Because of our case, people have been allowed to stay in their
homes.’”9 Indeed, forty-four states responded to Kelo by enacting new
or stronger legislation to protect home owners against the risk of a

1.
Kathleen Edgecomb, ‘I t Still H urts’: Fight To Save H om e Scars One Fort
Trumbull Family, Day (June 23, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20130623/
nws01/306239947/1069/rss.
2.
Id
3.
Id.
4.
545 U.S. 469,489-90 (2005).
5.
Kathleen Edgecomb, C ity Says Fort Trumbull Development Delayed, Day (May
17,2013), http://www.theday.eom/article/20130517/NWS01/305179945.
6.

Vision & Plans: N e w London 2013 and Beyond, N ew L ondon L andmarks ,

http://www.newlondonlandmarks.org/visionsPlans.htm (last visited Sept. 27,2014).
7.
Edgecomb, supra note 1.
8.
Id.
9.

Id.
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taking.10 We provide— for the first time— an empirical analysis of the
effect of both the Kelo decision and subsequent state legislation on
housing prices.
We argue in Part II that eminent domain laws have two
potentially competing effects on housing prices, through the home
buyer’s “condemnation risk discount” and the relevant real estate
market value. Home buyers include the risk of eminent domain— and
the potential losses caused by undercompensation through “fair market
value”— as a discount in the closing price of their properties.*11 Fair
market value of the property simultaneously may rise or fall depending
on the expectation that eminent domain projects are efficient, that is,
whether they will yield positive redevelopment or empty lots in the
relevant real estate market.
In Part III, we examine the Kelo decision and the national
response within the framework of the condemnation risk discount and
relevant real estate market theories. We argue that Kelo should have
caused an increase in condemnation risk discounts, given the concern
over increased usage of eminent domain in each state. Turning to state
legislative responses, we expect that home owners’ condemnation risk
discounts should have declined, on average, commensurate to the
strength of their legislatures’ assurances that they would not replicate
the city of New London’s development plan. Assuming the efficient
usage of eminent domain for private transfer, we contend that Kelo
should cause an increase in the relevant real estate market but that any
increases may have been undone by strong mil-Kelo legislation.
We test our condemnation risk discount theory in Part IV and
show that the empirical results are consistent with our theory. Kelo
had a statistically significant negative impact on the change in housing
prices across the nation. We further demonstrate that home prices
responded negatively, with statistical significance, to state legislation
following Kela, that is, the stronger the state’s response against Kelo,
the greater the negative impact on the change in housing prices. Those
states that took no action against the decision experienced an increase
in housing prices, largely recouping the losses caused by the initial
shock of Kelo.

10. SO State Report Card, C astle C oalition, http://castlecoalition.org/50-statereport-card (last visited Oct. 22,2014).
11. Another way to think about this concept is the price required to transform an
unwilling seller into a willing seller.
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H ome V aluation — A n E conomic F ramework

The Kelo poster children are the elderly husband and wife who
have spent their married lives together in their home and are suddenly
informed that their property has been condemned for a corporate
redevelopment project and are offered the fair market value in
exchange.12 Such an outcome strikes fear in the heart of any warm
blooded home owner. Legal scholars have argued that fair market
value undercompensates the elderly couple, focusing on the sense of
autonomy and sentimental value that is lost in the cold, economic
calculation.13 We propose a modified framework to understand the
elderly couple’s predicament by offering the condemnation risk
discount theory, suggesting that the market has integrated the risk of
undercompensation into housing prices.14 We then explore the
competing effects on home valuation through the potential benefits of
eminent domain.

A.

Subjective Premium

The Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay a
condemnee “just compensation,”15which is generally measured as the
property’s fair market value.16 The fair market value, in turn, is
calculated by estimating “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a
willing seller.”17 There is a natural intuition that this calculation misses
something critical, given that a seller who is forced to sell to the
government is, by definition, not willing.18 This gap in the calculation

12. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (“Petitioner Wilhelmina
Dery was bom in her Fort Trumbull house in 1918 and has lived there her entire life. Her
husband Charles (also a petitioner) has lived in the house since they married some 60 years
ago”).
13.
Sec, c.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 957, 958-59 (examining different claims for the difference between “just compensation”
and the value owners place on their property); Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation:
The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 Colum.L .R ev. 593 (2013) (explaining
the difference between fair market value and sentimental value). Contra Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy o f Eminent Domain, 105 M ich. L. Rev. 101, 101
(2006) (examining the dignitary harms arising in private transfer takings).
14.
See, eg., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 859,866 (explaining the effects of eminent domain on property values).
15. U.S. Const, amend. V
16. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24,25-26 (1984).
17. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,374 (1943).
18. See, eg., Krier & Serkin, supra note 14, at 866 (“The difficulty, of course, is that
in condemnation cases the sellers are not willing at all, however eager the buyers happen to
b e”).
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is described in the literature as the subjective premium.19 The
subjective premium is the additional amount of money a home owner
would be willing to accept to sell their home at fair market value.20
Subjective premium can be calculated by measuring the
difference between the owner’s value of their property (their
reservation price) and the market’s value of the property (fair market
value).21 Its movement is subject to private information22and is not
necessarily correlated with the property’s market value. The subjective
premium may increase over time as positive memories are accumula
ted in the home, such as the birth of a child or the achievement of
professional accomplishments. Conversely, there may be a sudden
drop in the subjective premium if negative personal experiences occur
there.
It is important to distinguish between those negative personal
experiences that cause a decline in the subjective premium and those
that may simultaneously decrease the subjective premium and the fanmarket value. Depending on the jurisdiction, a home seller may have a
duty to disclose the fact that a house may be haunted,23that a murder24
or death25 took place, or that a previous owner was significantly
indebted, in order to prepare for harassing calls or creditor visits.26
19. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics o f Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 83
(1986).
20. Lee, supra note 13, at 600.
21. See, e.g., Krier & Serkin, supra note 14, at 866 (“The difficulty, of course, is that
in condemnation cases the sellers are not willing at all, however eager the buyers happen to
be. They are unwilling precisely because, absent some statutory provision, they are not
compensated for moving expenses, loss of goodwill, consequential damages, nor, most
importantly, loss of consumer surplus—which is to say the amount by which an owner values
property over and above its fair market value. That amount, especially significant in the case
of residential property, has to be positive, for otherwise owners would already have sold their
holdings on the market.” (footnote omitted)).
22. Private information is available for potential buyers for all of the possible
disclosures on a home, but in the case of eminent domain revealing any private information is
not necessary. Nonetheless, a potential buyer would rely on public information to assess this
risk. It is clear that a neighborhood insider would be more likely to know to check the
potential risk of eminent domain if it exists in a given neighborhood.
23.
Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674-75 (App. Div. 1991).
24. Reed v. King, 145 Cal. App. 3d 261, 267 (Ct. App. 1983).
25. Milliken v. Jacono, 60 A.3d 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
26. See C al . C iv. C ode § 1710.2 (2012); C olo. R ev. Stat. § 38-35.5-101 (2013);
C onn . G en . Stat. § 20-329dd (2013); D el . C ode tit. 24, § 2930 (2014); F la . Stat. § 689.25
(2014); Ga . C ode § 44-1-16 (2014); H aw. R ev. Stat. § 467-14(18) (2013); Idaho C ode § 552802 (2014); Ky. R ev. Stat. § 207.250 (2014); L a . R ev. Stat. § 37:1468 (2013); M d . C ode ,
R eal P rop. § 2-120 (2014); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.600 (2013); N.M. Stat. § 47-13-2 (2013);
Okla . Stat. tit. 59, § 858-513 (2013); O r . Rev. Stat. § 93.275 (2013); R.I. G en . L aws § 520.8-6 (2013); S.C. Code § 27-50-90 (2013); S.D. Codified L aws § 43-4-44 (2013); T ex .
P rop. C ode § 5.008(c) (2013); U tah C ode § 57-1-37 (2012); Va . C ode § 55-524 (2014).
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Even if there is no duty to disclose, the fact of certain negative
characteristics may negatively impact the fair market value. The
subjective premium does not need to track these outcomes, and even if
it follows in tandem, the decrease does not need to be the same amount
as the fair market value decrease. When the home owner is prepared
to put their home on the market, their subjective premium is zero. Any
value greater than zero signifies that the home owner is not on the
market. The higher the subjective premium, the greater the resistance
to condemnation.
B.

Condemnation Risk Discount

Given the well-understood undercompensation problem in the
eminent domain context, the question arises: where is the insurance
market for the subjective premium? Eminent domain insurance has
been proposed to provide home owners protection against the risk of
regulatory takings.27 At least one insurance company considered
offering similar coverage for physical takings to California residents.28
These insurance market proposals are predicated on the difference
between fair market value and the compensation provided by the
government, however, and not on the subjective premium.25 The
problem for insuring the subjective premium is that it is, by definition,
subjective and impossible to verify in an insurance claim process.30
Real property insurance is generally founded on fair market value,
which will not help the condemnee who seeks more than fair market
value to cover their loss. In some instances outside the real property
context, there are “agreed value” insurance policies, but these would
also fail the home owner if their subjective premium has increased
since agreeing to the policy. There is consequently no formal
insurance available to cover sentimental value, in the real estate context
or elsewhere.31
27.
Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation”
B e Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 451, 499
(2003).
28.
Jon Coupal, Insurance Company To Offer Eminent Domain Insurance, H oward
Jarvis Taxpayers A ss ’n (May 12, 2008), http://www.hjta.org/califomia-commentary/insurancecompany-offer-eminent-domain-insurance.

29.

Id.
See, e.g., Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and
Protection: The Case o f Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q .J.E co n . 143, 143 (1977) (arguing
30.

that owners “w ill typically not fully insure an irreplaceable commodity and may even choose
to bet against\osmg it”).
31.
See, e.g., David Markell et al., What Has Love Got To D o with It?: Sentimental
Attachments and Legal Decision-Making, 57 VlLL. L. Rev. 209, 222 (2012) (“In short,
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In the absence of formal, structured insurance plans, home buyers
can deduct a condemnation risk discount from the closing sale price.
We argue that this discount serves as an intertemporal transfer by the
home owner, such that their subjective premium is not entirely lost.
Home owners compensate themselves at closing for the expected loss
of their subjective premium at the time of condemnation. Suppose that
we consider a rational, risk-averse agent who could sell their home at
price R (reservation price) if they want to sell.32 There is a probability
p that the government will decide to condemn their house. In that
case, they can only sell their house for fair market value. Therefore,
they would want to enter into a contract with an insurance company
that would ex ante offer them insurance to make sure they receive the
same marginal utility in both states of the world (condemnation and
noncondemnation).
Upon first consideration, one might think that condemnation risk
discounts reflect all eminent domain usage, not private transfer in
particular. The argument is that subjective premium is equally lost
whether the property is subsequently used for a hotel or for a public
park. While the condemnation risk discount may pick up some
amount of protection against idiosyncratic eminent domain usage, we
argue that the discount is largely limited to private transfers because of
the unique inability of home owners to avoid such condemnation risks.
If a home buyer is uniquely risk-averse, they can purchase a home far
away from major roads to avoid the risk of a highway expansion. If
they are concerned about the possibility that a town may want to create
additional parks through eminent domain, they can choose a town
saturated in parks or a community with truly blighted areas that could
benefit from restored public spaces. They can avoid a finding of blight
for their own property by maintaining it.
Private transfer is a different type of risk, primarily because the
municipality’s underlying calculus in pursuing private transfer is
mainly based on increasing the tax base.33 Private transfer for

sentimental value, defined broadly to include the endowment effect, information acquisition,
and traditional or popular notions of sentimental value, may be very difficult to place a
monetary amount on due to differences in subjective perception, both across contexts (are
you the owner or the would-be purchaser) and within contexts (you may value the home you
grew up in more than I do).”).
32. They could potentially sell at any price higher than R, but we will suppose they
sell at price R to simplify the analysis.
33. Rebecca Leung, Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, CBSN ews (Sept. 26, 2003),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eminent-domain-being-abused/ (citing 60 Minutes (CBS
television broadcast Sept. 28,2003) (reiterating that the Mayor of Lakewood told 60 Minutes
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economic development will almost always increase the tax base:
substituting one home for many condominiums, for example, will
necessarily increase tax revenues for the city. Home owners therefore
lack defensive actions to protect against this risk, unlike with more
“classic” public uses.34 It is this lack of alternatives on the part of the
home owner, to protect against private transfer, that necessitates a
condemnation risk discount in the housing market.
The condemnation risk discount should be contrasted with the
idea that laws generally may impact housing prices.35 Anup Malani
argues that housing prices may fluctuate in response to changes in
local laws “because more people want to live there.”36 This theory
serves as a compelling method for evaluating a law’s utility. In the
eminent domain context, however, the condemnation risk discount is
not a function of home owners “voting with their feet,” but a reflection
of an unavailable insurance market. Unlike other laws that can have
significant financial impact on voters, such as tort reform and
employment law,37 in the eminent domain context the expected loss is
so small that it is unlikely to motivate an otherwise stationary home
owner. The risk can be expected to impact housing prices on the
margin and the choice of neighborhood for a home buyer already
motivated to purchase.
The home buyer’s condemnation risk discount is dependent on
two primary variables: their expected subjective premium (M) and
their expected likelihood of condemnation (p). Supposing that the
home buyer is their own risk-neutral insurance company, they will
want to pay a premium P such that P=p.Mf This premium P is the
condemnation risk discount.
The expected subjective premium can be calculated by first
estimating the expected amount of time the home buyer will remain in
the home. For example, first-time home buyers generally move out
faster than trade-up buyers; in fact, it generally takes about thirteen
years for half of all first-time buyers to move out of their homes, which

that “she sought out a developer for the project because Lakewood’s aging tax base has been
shrinking, and the city simply needs more money”)).
34.
See generally Krier & Serkin, supra note 14, at 861 (describing the difference
between classic public uses and private transfers).
35.
See generally Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 H arv.L . R ev .
1273 (2008) (arguing that markets incorporate laws and their effects into prices).
36. Id. at 1275.
37. Id. at 1317-20.
38. We suppose that the insurance company is risk-neutral.
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is two years faster than general home buyers.39 By contrast, it takes
seventeen years for trade-up buyers to meet that threshold.40 Home
buyers can therefore estimate the length of time they will remain in the
home and the corresponding subjective premium fluctuations that may
occur over time.
The greater difficulty for the home buyer is calculating the
likelihood of condemnation.
It is exceedingly rare to find a
governmental entity that maintains careful usage data. In the absence
of publicly available condemnation statistics, home owners rationally
rely on signals to estimate the likelihood of condemnation, most
importantly public reporting—what we call “information flare-ups”—
and changing legislation.41
We define an information flare-up as a spike in public reporting
of eminent domain, where the spike mischaracterizes the fact that
eminent domain for private transfer is more consistently exercised.
Information flare-ups reveal the degree of negative publicity that a
condemning entity is willing and able to withstand. Moreover, it may
suggest that the local government uses eminent domain regularly in
more politically palatable contexts that do not gain local or national
coverage, which in turn undermines the home owner’s historical
estimation of the likelihood of condemnation. When the flare-up
subsides, it may cause home owners to mistakenly infer that eminent
domain activity has slowed down. A flare-up may distort condemna
tion risk discounts through a phenomenon called availability bias,
which is an individual’s estimation of the likelihood of condemnation
based on how easily they can think of an example of it having
occurred, detached from the actual likelihood of the risk.42 The effect
of Kelo as perhaps the most significant flare-up in recent eminent
domain action history is discussed in greater detail in Part III, below.
Local flare-ups occur more regularly and serve as a constantly
39. Paul Emrath, How Long Buyers Remain in Their Homes, N at’l A ss ’n H ome
B uilders (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=110770&
channelID=311.
40.
Id.
41. Sec, c.g., G eorge J. S tigler, T he T heory of P rice (3d ed. 1966) (explaining that
the optimal market price for a good is determined by the relationship between supply and
demand); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. Econ . 355 (1973) (analyzing how
signaling impacts job markets); George J. Stigler, The Economics o f Information, 69 J. P ol .
E con 213, 220-22 (1961) (analyzing the problems buyers have when ascertaining market
prices).
42.
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 Stan. L. R ev 683, 683 (1999); Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. E con .
L iterature 11,13 (1998).
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updating signal on the locality’s usage of eminent domain. Applied to
housing decision making, availability bias will tend to add some
potential irrationality in the short run, but in the long run this bias
could be smoothed out into rationality by adding more relevant
information.43
Home owners also rely on changes or expected changes in the
legal landscape to calculate the risk of eminent domain. The home
buyer will have over- and underestimated their condemnation risk
discount if the eminent domain laws or usage rates change in the time
period between when they purchased their home and when their
property is condemned or they put it on the market for resale. If, for
example, there was a high likelihood of condemnation when they
purchased their home, the home buyer may have secured a lower price.
When the laws tighten against condemnation, the home buyer enjoys a
higher resale price. Conversely, if that home buyer purchased their
home during a time when the risk of condemnation was low, they may
have factored in a very low condemnation risk discount. If there is
panic about the risk of eminent domain, or the laws relax at a later
point in time, the home buyer will bear the loss of the change in law.
Therefore, the home buyer would get more of a transfer of wealth if
the risk of eminent domain is low. Overall, note that the net gain for
both should be zero as the market would end up at an equilibrium in
order for a given house to be sold.
Kelo can be understood not only as an information flare-up but
also as an unreliable signal that the legal landscape may change.
Home owners may have anticipated that local governments would
become emboldened by the Supreme Court’s clear and unequivocal
pronouncement that an economic redevelopment plan may be upheld
under the Fifth Amendment. Once again, while Held's effect on
condemnation risk discounts should not be underestimated, it is by no
means the only example of unsteady legal landscapes.44 We expect
such dramatic swings in the legal landscape to cause concern for home
owners over how the dust will settle and, in turn, to impact
condemnation risk discounts.

43.
See Diederik A. Stapel et al., Contextual Determinants o f Strategic Choice:
Some Moderators o f the Availability Bias, 25 E ur . J. Soc . P sychol. 141,156-57 (1995).
44. The city of Aurora, Illinois, for example, developed a plan in 2000 to redevelop
RiverCity. To expedite the process, the city secured approval from the Illinois legislature to
use quick-take condemnation. The governor responded with an amendatory veto to the
quick-take bill. Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain, C astle C oalition 65 (Apr.
2003), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdl7report/ED_report.pdf.
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Relevant Real Estate Market

The risk of eminent domain cannot be understood in a vacuum,
nor should it be interpreted as a purely negative risk. While a home
owner in a nice home may want assurances that their property will not
be unexpectedly condemned, they may not be opposed to the
possibility that the unsightly apartments a few blocks away will be
condemned and replaced with a high-priced high-rise building. Real
estate is indeed affected by not only the behavior of a given home
owner, but by all of the surrounding neighborhood, which we would
describe as the relevant real estate market.45 Famously, the power of
eminent domain was wielded to revitalize the Ferry Building in San
Francisco, Dudley Street in Boston, and Skyland Shopping Center in
Washington, D.C., which increased home values in the surrounding
areas.46 We conceptualize the relevant real estate market as the
geographic zone that impacts a given property’s value. These eminent
domain action risks represent the likelihood that the relevant real estate
market will increase or decrease in value over time.
Decreasing the likelihood that an individual home owner’s
property may be condemned is necessarily correlated with a decreased
likelihood that another home owner’s property will be condemned for
economic development, assuming general uniformity of risk of
condemnation across residential homes. We envision eminent domain
for private transfer to function like a tornado with an uncertain path
that could hit anyone. The possibility that eminent domain can truly
revitalize a community, thereby increasing surrounding housing prices
along with the more direct benefits to those immediately impacted,
should not be forgotten. One of the most positive stories of
revitalization is the Melrose Commons Urban Renewal Project in the
South Bronx, New York. Plans were initially developed in the late
1980s.47 After some delay, the project began to move forward in
45. We adopt the economic principles underlying relevant markets in the antitrust law
context to the real estate market. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 391, 395 (1956) (defining monopoly power as “the power to control prices or
exclude competition” in the relevant market, where the relevant market is defined by products
that are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes”); see also
Stigler , supra note 41 (discussing optimal market prices in relation to supply and demand);
R.H. Coase, The Problem o f Social Cost, 3 J.L. & E con . 1, 1 (1960) (analyzing the
economics o f private nuisance law).
46. Hearing on the “Private Property Rights Protection A c t o f2013”: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution & Civil Justice o f the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. 64 (2013) (testimony of Andrew W. Schwartz).
47. Petr Stand et al., Melrose Commons, A Case Study for Sustainable Community
Design, Planners N etwork , http://www.plannersnetwork.org/magazine-publications/case-
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48 7 he original plan risked pricing out the low-income residents,
but after extensive coalition work with home owners, tenants, and
businesses, new plans that included mixed-income housing were
assembled.49 The thirty-five-block area now includes approximately
2,000 mixed-income housing units, retail space, and parks.50 Once
described as an “apocalyptic nightmare version of urban life,” the
South Bronx is now considered “[o]ne of the greatest real estate
turnarounds ever.” 51
Home prices have increased tenfold. 52
Development is continuing, in light of the project’s tremendous
success.53
We therefore theorize that the effect of eminent domain risk
should have competing effects on condemnation risk discounts and the
relevant real estate market. When there is an increased eminent
domain risk, there should be a simultaneous increase in the value of
the relevant real estate market and condemnation risk discounts,
assuming proper functioning of eminent domain for private transfer.
The prospect of large development projects increases fair market value
through the potential for improved housing, retail, and associated
economic gains. At the same time, it also increases the condemnation
risk discount because there is a heightened risk that the home owner’s
property will be condemned and, consequently, housing prices will
decrease.
There is active debate over the marginal effect that eminent
domain has on a state’s economy and real estate market, however,
because corporations are free to negotiate independently with home
owners to purchase larger tracts of land. Moreover, state and local
governments can incentivize development projects through tax
incentives, rezoning, and state economic development grants, to name
1994

studies-and-worldng-papers/melrose-commons-a-case-study-for-sustainable-community-design
(last visited Oct. 20,2014).
48. Mervyn Rothstein, A Renewal Plan in the Bronx Advances, N.Y. Times (July 10,
1994), http://www.n54tmes.com/1994/07/10/realestate/a-renewal-plan-in-the-bronx-advances.
html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
49.
Id.
50. Id.
51.
Les Christie, The Greatest Real Estate Turnaround Ever, CNN M oney (N ov. 25,
2009, 11:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/ll/09/real_estate/greatest_neighborhood_tum
around/.
52. Id. (“Each property sold for between $50,000 and $59,000 even thought [sic] it
cost an average of $ 110,000 to build.”).
53. See Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., New York City Neighborhoods: Melrose, the
Bronx, N.Y.C., http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/buyers/nychome-neighborhoods-bronxmelrose.shtml (last visited Sept. 27,2014).
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a few options.54 Opponents of eminent domain for private transfer
point to successful redevelopment projects that—though slow to
develop—revitalized communities.55 They further argue that eminent
domain is too easy of a tool for local government, such that it
incentivizes “inadequate planning and economic evaluation by
governments and/or undue influence of special interests.” 56 The
question remains, therefore, whether eminent domain risk does, in fact,
have a positive or negative effect on the housing market. If the
increased risk of eminent domain causes home owners to expect
demolished homes and empty lots because it is inefficiently exercised,
then it should trigger a decline in housing prices. Conversely, if an
increase in the likelihood of eminent domain is positively integrated as
a sign of higher-value redevelopment because eminent domain is
efficiently used, then it should cause an increase in fair market value.
Without the necessary information, the real estate market cannot
properly estimate the likelihood that private transfer via eminent
domain will yield the city of New London nightmare or the South
Bronx dream. This information failure also throws into question
whether redevelopers will move forward with their projects in an area
that offers tax incentives instead of eminent domain or if they will
relocate to an area that is friendly to private transfers via eminent
domain.

54. Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, President, Congress for New Urbanism in
Support o f Petitioners at 15, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108)
[hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist].
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 9.
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We represent the eminent domain trade-offs using the following
table:
Table 1: Eminent Domain Trade-Offs
Effect o f Condemnation Risk Discount
on Fair Market Value
u
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5co
w

Positive Effect

Negative Effect

Positive Effect

>0

Uncertain

Negative Effect

Uncertain

<0
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As Table 1 shows, there are two scenarios in which the effects of
condemnation risk discount and redevelopment plans will move in the
same direction (the upper-left and lower-right boxes). In order for
them to work together, the market must interpret redevelopment plans
as inefficiently decided or effectuated. In other words, the market
must expect a negative effect on fair market value arising out of a
government’s redevelopment plans. An illustration will help clarify the
point. If a local government restricts its ability to effectuate a private
transfer using eminent domain and home owners anticipate private
transfer to result in a city of New London catastrophe, the restriction
will increase fair market value by reducing the need for a condemna
tion risk discount. In addition, the restriction further increases fair
market value by reducing the likelihood of demolished homes and
empty lots. Conversely, if the government expands its ability, then
there will be an increased need to insure against the loss of the
subjective premium, which causes a decrease in fair market value.
This effect will be exacerbated by the negative effect on housing prices
as home owners brace for empty lots.
In the other two scenarios (the lower-left and upper-right boxes),
the effects are uncertain because the magnitude of the effects cannot be
known without empirical analysis. These scenarios are caused by the
market putting a positive expected value on a government’s redevelop-
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ment plan. As a result, if the government restricts its ability to
effectuate a private transfer using eminent domain and home owners
anticipate private transfer to potentially result in greater value to the
neighborhood, the restriction will increase fair market value by
reducing the need for a condemnation risk discount. The restriction
will decrease fair market value, however, by reducing the likelihood of
improved local value in the event of holdouts. Conversely, if the
government expands its ability, then there will be an increased need to
insure against the loss of the subjective premium, which causes a
decrease in fair market value. Such an effect will be counterbalanced
by the positive effect on housing prices, given that home owners expect
an improvement in the surrounding area.
Home owners seeking protection against condemnation of thenhomes will simultaneously harm the value of their assets by
advocating for such an outcome. The only way in which they can
guarantee that they will avoid negatively impacting their home prices
through advocacy is if eminent domain is inefficiently used.
III. P ricing E ffects of K elo v Ci t y of N e w L ondon and
S ubsequent State R esponses
In this Part, we apply the condemnation risk discount and relevant
real estate market theories to Kelo and the subsequent state responses.
We first conceptualize Kelo as an information flare-up and signal for
unsteady legal landscapes. We then review the varying state responses
to Kelo and anticipate the effect on housing prices.
A.

Kelo v. City of New London

The most widely known information flare-up is Kelo, where the
Supreme Court upheld the City of New London’s economic
revitalization project as a public use within the meaning of the Takings
Clause.57 While the decision caused an explosively negative public
reaction, it did not necessarily represent a change in the law. The
Justice Stevens-led majority concluded that the city’s development
plan embodied a “public purpose” because “our cases have defined
that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to
legislative judgments in this field.”58 In particular, the Court relied
heavily on the 1984 decision Hawaii Housing Authority v. MidkilT,59
57.
58.
59.

545 U.S. at 469-70.
Id. at 480.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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where the Court upheld a Hawaii statute that authorized the transfer of
fee title from lessors to lessees to combat concentrated land owner
ship.60
Interestingly (although unsurprisingly), M idkiff did not cause a
reaction anywhere near as explosive as what followed Kelo. The
Hawaii statute was targeted specifically at breaking up the
concentrated land wealth of very large landowners on the islands.61
The Hawaiian legislature sought to force wealthy landowners to
transfer ownership to long-standing property tenants.62 Home owners
were unable to relate to Hawaii’s unique concerns and, moreover, could
not identify with the condemnees. By contrast, the American home
owning public could appreciate the distress caused to the city of New
London condemnees when they were pushed aside for a redevelop
ment plan. In fact, following Kelo, T-shirts were sold with the slogan
“You Could Be Next: End Eminent Domain Abuse.”63
Some scholars interpreted the overwhelming national response to
Kelo as largely irrational, given that the decision did not create any
new law.64 Kelo may not have represented a change in the law, but it
was a vital signal to home owners. Justice O ’Connor anticipated in her
Kelo dissent that the decision would necessarily have an impact on the
real estate market. She warned: “The specter of condemnation hangs
over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any
farm with a factory.”65 On a purely local level, it was an indication that
the state of Connecticut and City of New London were able and
willing to withstand enormous political pushback because their
condemnation power was so strong. However, the reason a distinctly
60. Id. at 233.
61. Id. at 232 (“In the mid-1960’s, after extensive hearings, the Hawaii Legislature
discovered that, while the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the State’s
land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners. The legislature further
found that 18 landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, owned more than 40% of this
land and that on Oahu, the most urbanized of the islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the
fee simple titles. The legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible
for skewing the State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the
public tranquility and welfare.” (citations omitted)).
62. Id. at 233.
63. End Eminent Domain Abuse T-Shirt, Z azzle, http://www.zazzle.com/you_
could_be_next_t_shirt-23538936197962079 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (displaying a T-shirt
featuring the text “You Could Be Next: End Eminent Domain Abuse”).
64. Edward J. Lopez et al., Pass a Law, A n y Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses
to the Kelo Backlash, 5 Rev. L. & E con . 101, 102 (2009) (“[T]he Kelo ruling in June 2005
created no new law.”).
65. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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local case would cause an increase in condemnation risk discounts and,
in turn, decrease home price is because it created an unsteady legal
landscape. With such an unequivocal pronouncement from the
Supreme Court, home owners could not be certain whether the
decision would motivate local governments to flex their eminent
domain powers, due to the reduced likelihood of federal judicial
backlash.66
We expect a negative effect on fair market value given the media
coverage over Kelo at the time, even though Table 1 indicates that
either one of the right-hand boxes could be in play. With the potential
for local governments to follow the city of New London’s lead, there
was uncertainty over the likelihood of an increase in the potential for
large development projects via eminent domain. In theory, the
possibility of redevelopment should have caused a converse, positive
effect on the housing market; however, the media coverage at and after
the Kelo decision was strongly negative against eminent domain.67
Private transfers via eminent domain were described as having “failed
miserably” and examples of those failures were “not hard to find.”68
B.

Subsequent State Legislation

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Kelo, emphasized that
“nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”69 Forty-four states
responded by enacting new or stronger legislation to protect home
owners against the risk of a taking.70 The vast majority of states
responded swiftly but with varying degrees of aggressiveness.
Six states have chosen not to respond legislatively to the Kelo
decision.71 While evidence is limited, the available literature suggests
that these states are highly active in their eminent domain usage.72
Fifteen states made nominal changes to their eminent domain
legislation, but generally are not considered to have made any
66. This is not to say that state supreme courts did not put in their own restrictions.
See discussion infra Part IVA.2.
67. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (to Public), N.Y. T imes (July 30,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/weekinreview/30hptak.html?_r=2& (discussing
the public outrage over the Kelo discussion).
68. Brief Amicus Curiae of John Norquist, supra note 54, at 7.
69. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
70. 50 State Report Card, supra note 10.
71. Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma. Id.
72. See Yun-chien Chang, A n Empirical Study o f Compensation Paid in Eminent
Domain Settlements: N ew York City, 1990-2002,39 J. Legal Stud. 201 (2010).
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significant substantive change.73 Some of these states left open space
for eminent domain by including “obsolete” properties as available for
eminent domain action.74 Similarly, they kept the definition of public
use general to keep local governments flexible in using eminent
domain.
The remaining states engaged in substantive reform.75 The
relative strength of reform is measured by looking at the degree to
which the law forecloses the possibility of eminent domain for private
transfer. Those states that prohibited private transfers through eminent
domain in constitutional amendments are understood to have taken the
most aggressive approach to Kelo.16 The majority of aggressive states
did not go as far as amending their constitutions, but nevertheless took
strong stances through statutory reform. They ensured that there were
no or few openings in the definition of blight to circumvent the broad
prohibitions against private transfers through eminent domain.
Indiana, for example, prohibits private transfers and ensures that blight
is narrowly defined,77 but it maintains an exception for certified
technology parks.78 Indiana has sought to ensure that the technology
business is not dissuaded from growing in the state.79
The aggressive state responses signaled an increase in friction
against private economic development through eminent domain.
Florida is known as one of the states that provided some of the most
aggressive protections in response to Kelo. Shortly after the ruling,
Florida passed a law requiring local governments to wait ten years
before transferring land through eminent domain.80 The state
legislature and voters passed a constitutional amendment that requires
a three-fifths majority in both the house and senate to permit an
exception to using eminent domain for private development.81
Florida’s laws, according to the Institute for Justice, “effectively
73. Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, Alaska, Connecticut, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Ohio, California, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont. See 50 State
Report Card, supra note 10.
74. See, e.g., S.B. 68, 1st Spec. Sess. (Ala. 2005). The state legislature eventually
tightened the definition of blight in H.B. 654, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2006).
75. See 50 State Report Card, supra note 10.
76. Florida, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Virginia.
See Current State
Constitutional Provisions About Eminent Domain, Castle C oalition, http://www.castle
coalition.org/legislativecenter/185?task=view (last visited Nov. 1,2014).
77.
See H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assemb, 2d Reg. Sess. (bid. 2006).
78. 50 State Report Card, supra note 10.
79.
See Indiana Certified Technology Parks, Ind . Econ . D ev. C ore , http://iedc.in.
gov/programs-initiatives/indiana-certified-technology-parks (last visited Nov. 1,2014).

80.
81.

H.B. 1567,2006 Leg, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
H.R.J. Res. 1569,2006 Leg, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
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eliminat[e] condemnations for private commercial development.”82
Though such reactions should decrease home buyers’ condemnation
risk discounts and thereby increase home sale prices, we argue it
should also decrease homes’ fair market value in theory. Once again,
the empirical effects are difficult to anticipate theoretically, given that
either one of Table 1’s left-hand boxes may be triggered.83
It is important to understand that a state’s response might affect
home owners’ and buyers’ valuation for a given property due to a
belief bias. The belief bias in behavioral economics theorizes that a
home owner or buyer may use her own personal beliefs or potential
prior knowledge about the state response to Kelo to determine the
value of a given home.84 In particular, home owners and buyers may
have believed in the short run that stronger anti-Kelo legislation was
better for the housing market, without considering its effects on the
relevant real estate market. The short-run effect on housing prices may
reflect that fact without revealing competing negative effects.85 While
any such bias may create short-run irrational responses, in the long run
it will tend to disappear as the state response and its effects become a
clear and set form of information.86

82. Florida Enacts M eaningM Eminent Domain Reform, B ill One o f Strongest
Passed Nationwide, C astle C oalition (May 12, 2006), http://castlecoalition.org/press
releases/250-florida-enacts-meaningful-eminent-domain-reform-bill-one-of-strongest-passednationwide.
83. While our analysis focuses on state and local responses—which represent the
substantial portion of condemnation activity—the federal government also maintains the right
to eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment. U.S. C onst, amend. V In recent history, the
federal government has used eminent domain, through the Department of Justice’s Land
Acquisition Section, to further conversation efforts in, for example, the Everglades and New
Mexico’s Valles Caldera National Preserve.
Additional projects have included the
condemnation of land along the United States-Mexico border for national security interests.
Summary o f Litigation Accomplishments, U.S. D ep ’t Just. 12,29, 51-52 (2009), http://www.
justice.gov/enrd/ENRDFiles/ENRD_FY_2009_Accomplishment_Report.pdf.
84. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 42; Rabin, supra note 42; Stapel et al., supra
note 43.
85. Another factor that could create a belief bias was the simultaneous local
legislation underway at the same time. See discussion infra Part III.C.
86. See, eg., Jonathan St. B.T. E vans & David E. Over, R ationality and
R easoning (1996) (discussing human errors and biases in thinking and reasoning); Aydogan
Alti & Paul C. Tetlock, Biased Beliefs, Asset Prices, and Investment: A Structural Approach,
69 J. Fin . 325, 325 (2014); Jonathan St. B.T. Evans & Jodie Curtis-Flolmes, Rapid
Responding Increases B elief Bias: Evidence for the Dual-Process Theory o f Reasoning, 11
T hinking & Reasoning 382, 382 (2005) (examining how rapid decision making impacts the
bias effect); Donna Torrens et al., Individual Differences and the B elief Bias Effect: Mental
Models, Logical Necessity, and Abstract Reasoning, 5 T hinking & R easoning 1, 2 (1999)
(investigating individual differences in the belief bias effect).
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Local Legislative Responses

Local legislative activity occurred concurrently or, in some
instances, in the absence of state legislative responses to Kelo. Many
municipalities quickly passed resolutions condemning the Supreme
Court’s decision and requesting responsive federal and state
legislation.87 Dutchess County, New York, legislators, for example,
passed Resolution No. 205257 to “set[] policy for the county and
reassure [] constituents that property would not be taken by eminent
domain for economic gain.”88 The resolution prohibited the county
from exercising eminent domain for private transfer.
While
impassioned, “[t]he authority . . . exercised in the resolution was to
create county policy not law.”89 Dutchess County’s resolution and
other resolutions passed in the wake of Kelo are properly understood
as statements of policy and not binding law, similar to Congress’s antiKelo resolution.90
Other localities passed ordinances— that function as local law, in
contrast with resolutions—with varying degrees o f success.91 The
uncertainty over a municipality’s authority to pass legislation in the
absence of state action or that is different from state legislation puts
into doubt whether many of these ordinances are properly understood
as valid laws.92 Notably, in Amesbury, Massachusetts, voters passed
Ordinance 2006-013 in an attempt to restrict eminent domain for
private transfer, given the absence o f successful legislation on the state
level.93 In Massachusetts, however, the ordinance required the state
87. See, e.g., Res. 299, Organizational Meeting, Del. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (N.Y.
2005) (on file with authors); Memorandum from the Office of the City Manager of Simi
Valley, Cal., to the City Council of Simi Valley, Cal. (June 11, 2007) (on file with authors)
(“On M ay 8, 2006, the City Council adopted a resolution that prohibits the use o f eminent
domain to acquire real property designated or occupied for residentialpurposes for purposes
other than right-of-way, public infrastructure, orpublic facilities.’’).
88. Minutes, Dutchess County, N.Y., Legislature, Regular Bd. Meeting (Sept. 19,
2005) (on file with authors).
89. E-mail from Shannon LaFrance, Drafter & Sponsor of Dutchess County
Resolution No. 205257, to author (Nasser-Ghodsi) (Feb. 6, 2014, 3:37 PM) (on file with
authors).
90. H.R. Res. 340,109th Cong. (2005).
91. See, e.g., Local Legislation on Eminent Domain, Castle C oalition, http://www.
castlecoalition.org/legislativecenter/183?task=view (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (listing local
eminent domain reforms).
92. See Dale Krane et al., Home Rule in America: A Fifty-State Handbook
203-11 (2001).
93. Thatcher W. Kezer III, Annual Report o f the Town o f Amesbury, Sch. W orld,
http://schoolsites.schoolworld.com/schools/AmesburyPS/files/filesystem/Annual%20Report
%202008.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014); see also Letter from Mark R. Reich, Attorney,
Kopelman & Paige, P.C., to the Honorable Thatcher W. Kezer, Iff, Mayor of Amesbury,
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legislature’s approval.94 The governor of Massachusetts ultimately
vetoed the petition.95 Massachusetts is generally known as a flexible
state with respect to a municipality’s right to home rule, thereby
casting doubt on the effectiveness of comparable laws in more
restrictive states.
Even where municipal legislation may have been effectively
passed, there is varying strength among those ordinances. Newport
Beach, California, successfully amended its charter to include
limitations on eminent domain, but created a sizeable loophole in
stating, “The City of Newport Beach and/or any City-affiliated agency
shall not exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire any property
from the owner of the property, without the owner’s consent, for the
sole purpose of transferring the property to another person to further
private economic development.”96 Consequently, the practical impact
of the Newport Beach amendment and similar legislation is likely very
small.97 Most anti-A'e/o municipal ordinances generally prohibit the
use of eminent domain for private transfer, leaving gaps in the
definition of private transfer and not touching blight definitions. We
therefore interpret the majority of these ordinances as codifying a
general pro-property rights sentiment.98

Jonathan Sherwood— A mesbury D istrict 6 (Apr. 24, 2006), http://sherwoodd6.blog

spot.com/2008/08/eminent-domain-govemors-veto.html (follow “the Mayor’s proposal and
the legal opinion here” hyperlink) (recommending changes to the proposed municipal
legislation).
94.
See Krane et al ., supra note 92.
95. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Governor, Mass., to Senate and House of
Representatives, Mass. (Aug. 7, 2008) (explaining veto of H.B. 4583) (on file with Jonathan
Sherwood, District 6 City Councilor).
96. N ewport B each , C al ., M unicipal C ode § 1.35.020 (2014) (emphasis added).
97. Ilya Somin reached similar conclusions about state-level activity. See Ilya Somin,
The Limits o f Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 M inn . L. R ev. 2100,
2103-04 (2009) (finding that the “majority of the newly enacted post-ATe/o reform laws are
likely to be ineffective”).
98. See, e.g., Wasilla, Alaska, Ordinance 05-78 (Oct. 24, 2005) (“The city may
exercise the powers of eminent domain and declaration of taking in the performance of an
authorized power of function of the city [(municipality)], in accordance with AS 09.55.240
through 09.55.460; provided that the city may exercise the powers o f eminent domain or
declaration o f taking to acquire property only i f the city will own, or i f the public will have
the legal right to use, the property, and the city m ay not exercise the powers o f eminent
domain or declaration o f taking to provide property for private economic development. The
exercise of the power of eminent domain or declaration of taking shall be by resolution of the
council.” (citation omitted)).
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IV. E m pir ic a l A n a l y sis
We saw in the previous Part the theoretical analysis of the effect
of Kelo and the subsequent state responses on the housing market. In
this empirical Part, we seek to (1) measure analytically the importance
of the Kelo decision on housing prices and (2) measure how the state
responses to Kelo affected those prices.
A.

Data

We built a data set for all fifty states in the United States between
the years 1997 and 2011. The database contains the Housing Price
Index (HPI), gross domestic product, unemployment, total personal
income, population, real estate earnings, income taxes, state building
permit construction of nonresidential buildings, poverty rates, state
revenues, state debt, and state expenditures per state over the period of
interest." The data set also contains information about the states’
responses to K elo: We report the state’s grade of the Kelo response,
whether or not the law was the result of a citizen initiative, and whether
or not the veto by the governor of a given state was overruled. We also
report the potential existence of multiple responses to Kelo, given that
some states have experienced more legislative activity in response to
Kelo than others. Description of the data is discussed in greater detail
in the following Subparts.
1.

Housing Price Index

We collected both yearly and quarterly data on the HPI from the
Federal Housing Finance Agency from 1997 to 2011.100 The HPI is a
broad measure of the movement of single-family house prices.
The HPI is a weighted, repeat-sales index, meaning that it measures
average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same
properties. This information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage
transactions on single-family properties___
The HPI serves as a timely, accurate indicator of house price trends
at [the state] level[]. Because o f the breadth of the sample, it provides
more information than is available in other house price indexes. 101

99. Our main analysis will include the HPI, Kelo variables, GDP, unemployment,
total personal income, rental earnings, poverty line, and permit building construction. The
other variables do not affect or change our results.
100. House Price Index, F ed . H ousing F in . A gency, http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/
Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
101. Id.
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The index controls for any particular variation of housing determinants
and minimizes the heteroskedasticity in the variance of the error
terms.102
2.

Judicial and Legislative Variables

The Kelo decision is assigned a dummy variable that takes a
value of one for the two quarters following the decision’s publication
on June 25, 2005.103 The opinion was released at the end of the second
quarter of 2005, so the third and fourth quarters of that year are
grouped together to reflect the short-run effect of Kelo. This approach
controls for any time lags in education among the population about the
opinion and is justified by the national surveys taken in the third
quarter of 2005 to assess the public’s reaction.104
We reviewed indices created105or suggested106by others before
constructing a novel index to represent the strength of each state’s
legislative response to Kelo (2005 to 2011). The Castle Coalition
established a comprehensive fifty-state grading scheme to evaluate
state legislative activity. The Castle Coalition is a pro-property rights
organization founded in 2002 to combat “eminent domain abuse” and
is the Institute for Justice’s “nationwide grassroots property rights
activism project.”107 The Castle Coalition provides a grade (A through
F) to each state according to its legislative response to Kelo. The
Castle Coalition’s grading scheme, while thorough, fails to include the
role of the judiciary in forming a state’s eminent domain legal
landscape. In addition, their grading scheme also does not adjust as
the laws change over time. The Castle Coalition released a 50 State
Report Card in August 2007 with its grades at that point in time.108 It
102. See, e.g., Martin J. Bailey et al., A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index
Construction, 58 J. A m . Stat. A ss ’n 933 (1963) (exploring the difficulty of constructing index
prices); Bradford Case et al., On Choosing Am ong House Price Index Methodologies, 19
Real E st. E con . 286 (1991) (comparing indexes under different methodologies); Karl E.
Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Efficiency o f the Market for Single-Family Homes, 79 A m .
E con . Rev. 125 (1989) (discussing the efficiency of the single-market home).
103. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
104. The Zogby Survey (American Farm Bureau Survey) was taken from October 29
to November 2, 2005. The Saint Index Poll (Center for Economic and Civic Opinion,
University of Massachusetts/Lowell) was taken in October-November 2005. See PROPERTY
Rights : E minent D omain and R egulatory Takings Re -examined 104 (Bruce L. Benson
ed., 2010); Somin, supra note 97, at 2109.
105. See About Us, C astle C oalition, http://www.castlecoalition.org/about (last
visited Sept. 28,2014).
106. See Somin, supra note 97, at 2100.
107. About Us, supra note 105.
108. 50 State Report Card, supra note 10.
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also has an active website that grades the states based on their most
recent legislative changes.109 Many states passed one law prior to
August 2007, such that the grade they were given in the Castle
Coalition’s original report remains the same today.110 Some states
passed one law after August 2007.**111
Given the Castle Coalition’s potential bias, we could not rely on
their grades. We consequently were compelled to create an original
index. Our index is similarly predicated on a 4.0 grade scale, but is
based on the risk that eminent domain will be used for private transfer
without any comment on whether the state uses eminent domain
efficiently or inefficiently. If a state fails to respond to Kelo, it is given
a failing grade, based on the assumption that voters expected some
form of legislative response as an assurance that eminent domain
would not be used for private benefit.112 Legislative responses are
awarded an above-failing grade depending on whether they address
two issues and the extent to which they address them: (l)th e
definition of blight113 and (2) the explicit prohibition of eminent
domain for private transfer.
A perfect score (4.0) requires a
constitutional amendment that prohibits private transfer and restricts
blight to safety hazards for all home owners. A constitutional
amendment is the strongest legislative protection due to the difficulty
in changing it in the future. State intervention that closes one opening
(blight or economic development) but leaves the other open is given a
low grade (2.75 or 2.5) depending on the strength of the closed route.
States that close both routes for the majority of (but not all) residents
are given a relatively high grade (3.0-3.5). Depending on the state,
multiple grades may be assigned over the time period from 1997 to
2011 because states might have passed multiple laws.
We treat judicial intervention as a substitute for legislative action.
Four state supreme courts have made significant anti-Kelo rulings

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. For example, Minnesota is a troublesome state for purposes of the Castle
Coalition grade. In the August 2007 report card, it was given a B-. 50 State Report Card:
Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, C astle C oalition (Aug. 2007),
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pd£'publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf. In the most
recent iteration, it was given a B. 50 State Report Card supra note 10. However, in the
intervening years, the law has actually weakened. See id.
112. See, for example, New York. See id.
113. See Somin, supra note 97, at 2120 (“Sixteen states have enacted post-Kelo reform
laws whose effect is largely negated by exemptions for blight condemnations under
definitions of blight that make it possible to include almost any property in that category.”).
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since 2005: New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.114 The
South Dakota ruling, though strong, had no effect on the data set
because the opinion was entered on January 24, 2006, and the South
Dakota constitutional amendment was passed on February 17, 2006,'15
both within the first quarter of that year. New Jersey and Oklahoma’s
judicial responses were given a 0.7 score because they left open blight.
By contrast, Ohio’s judicial response was sufficiently strong to warrant
a 3.3 grade.'16
As discussed above, there was some legislative activity on the
municipal level following Kelo, but we exclude those effects for
purposes of our empirical analysis. Empirically, there are too few
municipalities that passed ordinances to have an impact on the
quarterly or annual HPI at the state level. On a theoretical basis, there
are two general scenarios that occurred. First, the state enacted
relatively stronger anti-Kelo legislation, but local governments
maintained weak laws on their books. In that case, the local govern
ments are bound by the stricter state requirements on the basis of state
preemption of local laws.117 Second, the state enacted relatively weak
anti-ATe/o legislation but local governments enacted stronger laws. In
that case, our empirical results of the effect of the relative strength of a
state’s law is, in fact, a lower bound, given that even where there are
weak state laws, there may have been stronger protections in some
municipalities.

114. Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447 (N.J. 2007);
City of Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115; Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Lowery, 2006 OK 31, 136 P.3d 639; Benson v. State, 2006 SD 8, 710
N.W.2d 131.
115. Five Years A fter Kelo; The Sweeping Backlash Against One o f the Supreme
Court’s Most-Despised Decisions, INST. FORJUST., http://www.ij.org/five-years-after-kelo-thesweeping-backlash-against-one-of-the-supreme-courts-most-despised-decisions (last visited
Oct. 31, 2014).
116. The Supreme Courts of Hawaii, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, issued
rulings after Kelo, but given that their decisions were based largely on evidentiary standards,
they do not qualify for our index system. See County of Hawaii v. C&J Coupe Family Ltd.
P’ship, 198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008); Centene Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Mint Props., 225
S.W.3d 431 (Mo. 2007); Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007); R.I.
Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006).
117. See, e.g., Robert W. Bower, Jr., Comment, Home Rule and the Pre-Emption
Doctrine: The Relationship Between State and Local Government in Maine, 37 M e . L. Rev.
313, 348-51 (1985) (discussing the various methods for delegating power to local govern
ments).
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Additional Controls

We collected data on gross domestic product (GDP) on a yearly
basis from the Bureau of Economic Analysis between 1997 and
2011.118 We retrieved yearly and quarterly unemployment rates from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics over the period from 1997 to 2011.119 In
addition, we collected yearly and quarterly data on total personal
income per state from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the period
from 1997 to 2003. Personal income represents the income received
by all persons of the state from all sources during each year or quarter.
Personal income is calculated as the sum of net earnings by place of
residence, property income, and personal current transfer receipts.120
We considered the annual poverty rate by state, from United
States Census data, yearly between 1997 and 2011.121 We also
controlled for yearly building permits per state over the same period
using Census data. The building permit construction data covers all
“permit-issuing places,” which are jurisdictions that issue building or
zoning permits within the states.122 This data is helpful for controlling
for a state’s participation in the real estate market on a yearly basis. We
also used in-state governments’ expenditures data, from the United
States Census Bureau, during the years 1997 to 2011. We considered
the state revenue, state expenditure, and state debt during that same

118. Regional Economic Accounts: Download, Bureau Econ. Analysis (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm (select “NAICS Real GDP” from
“Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State” toolbar).
119. Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Bureau Lab. Stat., http://www.bls.gov/
lau/#tables (last visited Oct. 14,2014).
120. Regional Economic Accounts: Download supra note 118 (select “Annual state
personal income and employment, all tables and areas” from “State Personal Income
accounts” toolbar). Note that personal income is measured before the deduction of personal
income taxes and other personal taxes and is reported in current dollars (no adjustment is
made for price changes). To control for the potential effect of taxes, we collected the taxes on
production and imports yearly over the period from 1997 to 2011. This tax data was collected
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These taxes consist mainly of general sales and
property taxes. They are measured in millions of dollars.
121. Poverty, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/publica
tions/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
122. Building Permits Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/
constructioiVbps/historicaLdata/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). As the Census Bureau
indicates: “Zoning permits are used only for areas that do not require building permits but
require zoning permits. Areas for which no authorization is required to construct a new
privately-owned housing unit are not included in the survey.” Building Permits Survey: How
the Data Are Collected U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/construction/bps/
how_the_data_are_collected (last visited Sept. 28,2014).
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time period.1’1 We also added the real estate, rental, and leasing
earnings per state and quarter for 1997 to 2011, from the Census
Bureau, to take into account potential substitutions between owning
and renting.1’4 We also got the population for each state from Census
Bureau data.135
To make sure our analysis is not affected by the early 2000s’
housing bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, we used state and year
fixed effects. State and year fixed effects ensure that our analysis
controls for potential differing effects of a given crisis in a state at a
particular point in time.126 We can therefore reliably examine the
impact of the Kelo decision on the change in price index in the
following Subpart; then we will turn to the effect of the response to
Kelo.127
The following table (Table 2) shows the summary statistics of our
sample.
Table 2: Sample Statistics

Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation:
Overall

Min

Max

Independent Variables
House Price Index (HPI)
Quarterly Change in HPI

180.63
1.18

45.59
4.29

82.02
-25.28

344.07
25.99

0.43
9.7
5.4
2.03
2.92
12.22
42.05

0.49
2.33
2.04
2.44
4.21
3.24
45.02

0
3.95
2.1
0.12
0.73
4.5
11.6

1
18.11
14.1
17.1
29.1
23.1
335.81

Control Variables
Kelo
GDP
Unemployment
Total Personal Income
Rental Earnings
Poverty Line
Permit Buildings Construction

123. State Government Finances, U.S. C ensus Bureau, https://www.census.gov/govs/
state/historical_data.html (last visited Oct. 14,2014).
124. Economic Research, F ed . Res . Bank St. L ouis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/categories/27281 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014) (select link to any state, scroll to bottom of
page, and select “Real Estate, Rental and Leasing Earnings in [state name]”).
125. Population Estimates, U.S. C ensus B ureau, https://www.census.gov/popest/
data/historical/ (last visited Oct. 14,2014).
126. See A. Colin C ameron & P ravin K. Trivedi, M icroeconometrics: M ethods
and A pplications (2005), available at http://www.centroportici.unina.it/centro/Cameron&
Trivedi.pdf; J effrey M. W ooldridge, E conometric A nalysis of C ross Section and
Panel Data (2002), available at http://jrvargas.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/wooldridgej_2002_econometric_analysis_of_cross_section_and_panel_data.pdf; Amit Goyal & Pedro
Santa-Clara, Idiosyncratic R isk Matters!, 58 J. F in . 975,975 (2003).
127. We also use a cross-effect variable multiplying state and time specific dummies
as a robustness check. Our results remain unchanged.
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Estimation ofthe Impact o f Kelo on Housing Prices

We will first estimate the direct impact of Kelo on the change in
housing prices using a quarterly data set. We will then test if the state
response to Kelo had a sizeable effect on the real estate market for
each state during the post-Kelo period.
To directly measure the impact of Kelo on the change in the HPI,
we consider the following model:
A H P I= aK it +fiXk +ek
AHPIit is the quarterly change in the HPI in state i at time t. K it is a
discrete variable indicating Kelo in state i at time t. (For the quarterly
data, the value 1 for K corresponds to the third and fourth quarters of
the year 2005 to highlight the fact that the surveys and application of
the Kelo decision would be best reflected in the prices of houses sold
after the decision and that it might take two quarters for home prices to
adjust to the announcement of the Kelo decision.) It is important to
use the change in the HPI to measure the change in real estate prices
between periods.
X it represents the matrix of covariates (GDP, unemployment,
construction, personal income, poverty rates, rental earnings, which
were developed in the previous Subpart of this Article) and a constant.
As mentioned earlier, all specifications include year fixed effects and
state fixed effects to make sure we control for any potential state- and
year-specific swings in the housing market. We add a robustness
check by crossing the state and time effect in our model to better
capture the effect of any potential shock in a given state during a
period of time. In other words, we control for any and all effects of the
recession and the housing crisis or the prerecession bubble.
Table 3: Regression Results with Pooled OLS (Time and State FE)128
Variable
Kelo
GDP
Unemployment
Total Personal Income
Rental Earnings
Poverty Line
Permit Building Construction
Constant

r

(1)
-1.53 (0.49)**
-1.70(1.16)**
-0.83 (0.08) **
-5.56 (1.38)**

5.43(1.13)**
R2=0.28

128. Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity.

r

r
(3)
(2)
-1.57(0.48)**
-1.57(0.56)**
-1.91 (0.09)**
-2.71 (1.32)**
-0.73 (0.09) *» -0.68 (0.10) **
-8.57 (1.94)**
-4.65 (3.06)**
3.55 (1.37)**
6.08(1.19)**
0.06(0.05)
3.18 (0.75)**
5.21(1.19)**
4.66(1.70)**
R2-0.28

R2-0.30
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We see in Table 3 that the results of the regression seem to
indicate that Kelo had a potential negative and significant, but small,
effect on the change in the HPI over time, irrespective of the
specification. The coefficient is -1.57, reflecting that the expected
difference between a pre- and post-Kelo average home price in a given
state would be discounted by 1.57% if we were holding all of the other
potential determinants of the change in the HPI constant. This effect is
all the more emphasized by the difference over the entire period from
1997 to 2011, pre- and post-Kelo, by a similar negative impact of -1.57
in the change in a given state’s HPI when holding everything else
constant. All of these results show that Kelo, despite being only a
reaffirmation o f the existing law, contributed to a statistically
significant decrease, albeit very small, in the change of housing prices
in the real estate market in any state over the post-Kelo era.129
We also ran a similar regression using fixed effects to control for
the effects of time-invariant variables with time-invariant effects. We
find the following results in Table 4.
Table 4: Regression Results with Fixed Effects (Time and State FE)130
Variable
Kelo
GDP
Unemployment
Total Personal Income
Rental Earnings
Poverty Erne
Permit Building Construction
Constant

7.57 (5.75) **

6.04 (1.17) **

(3)
-1.57(035)**
-2.71 (2.01)
-0.68(0.14)**
-4.65(7.98)
3.55 (2.04)*
0.06(0.07)
3.18(1.51)**
5,10(2.01)**

R2-0.25

R2*=0.34

R2=0.30

Cl)
-1.54(0.35)**
-1.70(1.75)
-0.83(0.12)**
-5.56(2.64)**

"

(2)
-1257(0.35)**
-1.91 (1.15)
-0.73(0.08)**
-8.57(1.43)**
6.08 (0.88)**

”

Note that we obtain similar results when we consider the fixed
effect estimator. Kelo had a negative significant effect on the change
in the HPI. It leads to a decrease of -1.57 in the change of the HPI,
controlling for the determinants of the housing pricing.131
Overall our empirical analysis of the effect of Kelo shows that we
are not in the upper-left comer of our table presenting the eminent
domain trade-offs (Table 1): the negative effect of Kelo seems to show
that the effect of the condemnation risk discount value and of the
relevant real estate market could not have both been positive right after
129. These results are also robust to a tighter quarter state fixed effects.
130. Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity.
131. We tested for potential heteroskedasticity for the fixed effect model, using a
modified Wald test. We concluded that heteroskedasticity was present and we controlled for
it in our analysis.
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Kelo. Based on the fact that the decision reinforced some negative
prior probability distributions for both the market and the risk of
condemnation, we expect that the bottom left of our matrix in Table 1
best reflects the short-run environment.
C.

Estimation ofthe Impact o f State Responses to Kelo on Housing
Prices

In the previous section we showed on a panel data set that Kelo
had a small, significant negative effect on the HPI for states over the
period from 1997 to 2011. As a result of Kelo, some states enacted
laws to provide their constituents with a commitment not to increase
eminent domain usage, at diverse levels of efficacy. We use panel data
analysis in this Subpart to understand the potential effects of the
strength of the state laws in the post-Kelo world on the HPI.
We consider the effect of the grades that we constructed and
assigned to each state from the time period those laws, if any were
passed in a given state, were implemented, and a range of control
variables on the HPI real estate index change:
AHPIjt =

ge

Gradesit fiX jt +Xt +Qj +eit,

where i indexes represent states and t represents time. The years
considered, as they are responses to Kelo, are 2005 through 2011.
The left-hand side is the change in the HPI as in the precedent
regression, per state and time period (yearly or quarterly). Our
measure of grades is taken from the grades from our index. The
control variables are the same as the ones in the previous section (GDP,
unemployment, construction, personal income, poverty rates, rental
earnings, and a constant). We include state and time fixed effects. All
regressions are weighted least squares with weights based on state
populations. All of the estimates in the table are adjusted for potential
serial correlation in the panel data. The summary statistics are
presented in Table 5.
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Table 5: Sample Statistics After Kelo

Variable

Mean

Standard
Deviation:
Overall

Min

Max

Independent Variables
House Price Index (HPI)
Quarterly Change in HPI

213.07
-0.4

38.5
7.23

109.8
-31.91

344.07
33.74

11.76
6.42
2.42
30.47
19.72
12.73
45.34

2.17
2.47
2.83
43.16
23.81
3.1
48.18

3.95
2.3
0.21
1.41
2.31
5.4
1.68

181.13
14.1
17.1
308.7
133.61
21.5
335.81

1.69
0.05
0.003
0.71

1.43
0.21
0.06
0.45

0
0
0
0

4
1
1
1

Control Variables
GDP
Unemployment
Total Personal Income
Rental Eamings
Income Tax
Poverty Line
Permit Buildings Construction

Kelo Response (After Kelo)
State Grade
Citizen Intervention
Veto Overule
State Response

We notice that around 71% of our sample made an intervention
against Kelo, with different degrees of severity against it. O f those, the
average state grade is 2.36 with a variance of 1.13. Note that in our
summary table above, as it includes the failing grades, the overall
response grades were on average low, with a 1.69 mean.
We show in Table 6 the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
results of the regression of the state grades on the change in the HPI.
The grades are from the highest (4.0) to the lowest (0.0). We control
for potential heteroskedasticity of our data. We also have some
controls for each year and each state to make sure that we tease out the
effect of any potential housing or financial crisis during the period
when the grades were set. We also ran a robustness check by using
quarter- and state-specific fixed effects.
The empirical analysis indicates that in a post-Afe/o world, the
higher a state legislation’s grade, the greater the decrease in a change
in the HPI, on average. Specifically, an increase in one GPA point
leads to a decrease of -1.14 in the change in the HPI on average,
holding everything else constant. This result means that, on average,
the better the protection a state law offers, the more the HPI suffers as
a consequence. The empirics are consistent with the eminent domain
trade-off discussed in Part II and establish that the market interprets
private transfer via eminent domain to have a positive expected value
on housing prices, the condemnation risk discount notwithstanding.
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Home owners integrate the relative lost opportunity for a better
surrounding neighborhood using eminent domain if a state tries to
commit itself to protect home owners against any risk of
condemnation.
Table 6: Regression Results with Pooled OLS (Time and State FE)132
r

Variable
Kelo Grade
GDP
Unemployment
Total Personal Income
Rental Earnings
Poverty Line
Permit Building Construction
Constant

a)
- n s (o.i7)**
-0.90 (0.26)**
-0.09 (0.8)
-2.90 (0.73)**
7.90(2.34)**

(2)
”
-1.14(0.17)**
-0.98 (0.26)**
-0.05 (0.8)
-1.96(0.98)**
7.90 (2.34)**

16.28 (2.87) **

1.93(1.36)
17.75 (3.04) **

(3)
-1.14(0.17)**
-1.02 (0.27)**
-0.13 (0.09)
-1.89 (0.98)**
7.71 (2.34)**
0.18(0.12)
2.12(1.06)*
13.05 (2.81) **

R2-0.22

R2=0.23

R2-0.23

r

In order to fully confirm this result, we used a fixed effect
regression with robustness adjustments to check if our results were
consistent. The same effect is found in the fixed effect regression as
reported in Table 7 below.
Table 7: Regression Results with Fixed Effects Panel Data
(Time and State FE)133
Variable
Kelo Grade
GDP
Unemployment
Total Personal Income
Rental Earnings
Poverty Line
Permit Building Construction
Constant

r

a)
-1.18(030)**
41.90(0.40)*’
-0.09(0.14)
-2.90(0.93)**
1.01 (0.17)**

(2)
-1.14(0.28)**
-0.98(0.42)**
-0.05(0.15)
-1.96(1.00)**
7.90(2.33)**

16.09 (3.88) **

1.93(2.05)
14.54(4.03)**

(3)
-1.14(0.28)**
-1.02(0.43)**
-0.13(0.18)
-1.89 (1.04)*
7.71 (2.41)**
0.18 (0.19)
2.12 (2.08)
14.54 (4.03) **

R2=0.06

R2 0.08

R2=0.OS

'

r

We find that in the post-Kelo world, stronger protection against
condemnation by states seems to lead to potential decreases in the
change in the HPI, i.e., the level of price of the real estate within a state
is subject to less variation than in a state that has a clear protection
against Kelo.
In addition, we investigated further the potential gap between the
two extreme cases, where no law was passed as a response versus the
ones that had the strongest of responses: post-We/o, the states that

132. Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity.
133. Correcting for potential heteroskedasticity.
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passed the most aggressive laws had a smaller negative change in the
HPI when compared to those states that passed low-protection laws.
Thus, there is a clear divide between the two extreme cases, which
again indicates the inevitable trade-offs between condemnation risk
discount and relevant real estate market value.
When we consider the effect of each particular grade by grouping
grades into five groups by strength (3.75 to 4.0, 3.0 to 3.75, etc.), we
have some other revealing results: states with a good to average grade
(2.75 to 3.5)—that is, with some form of commitment on challenging
the law but not a total commitment—see on average a greater decrease
in the HPI (-2.16) compared to the states with low grades (0.0 or 0.75
grades), significant at the 95% level of confidence. The effect is even
stronger when we consider only the failing grades: a failing grade
leads to an increase in the HPI of 1.32, significant at the 90% level of
confidence. Grades that are 3.0 on average lead to a decrease o f -2.22
in the change in the HPI. The other grades do not have as significant
of an effect.
Low to failing grades (0 to 2.75) lead to an overall increase in the
difference in the HPI change of 1.89 compared to the higher grades
(3.0 to 4.0). This substantiates our conjecture that higher grades,
originally seen as a better protection against the condemnation risk,
potentially decrease the confidence (and therefore prior probability
distribution) of potential buyers or sellers due to the lack of potential
growth in the relevant real estate market. Moderate responses to Kelo
provide more leeway for states to adjust to a downward sloping
neighborhood quality. With a strong protection, the state is left out of
levers to make needed adjustments over time.
We also considered the determinants of a given response based
on the characteristics of a given state. A strong response usually
happens in states where rental earnings have a negative effect and
where personal income has a positive effect. An average response
usually happens in states with negative rental earnings but also
negative personal income, positive GDP levels, and a positive effect on
unemployment levels. A weak response (0.75 or below) has the
complete opposite characteristics:
rental earnings are positive,
personal income is positive, and unemployment is negative.
If we take into account the other determinants of a state’s decision
on post-Kelo legislative development, notably the passage of
subsequent legislation, the origin of the law (politician or citizen
initiative), and the potential for governor veto, we find that our results
are consistent with the previous regression results.
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We use a probit estimation to determine significant triggers of a
state response to Kelo. Our estimation of the determinants of a state
response to Kelo gave two main indicators of the increased probability
of a state response: the rate of unemployment and the poverty level.
Both of those indicators seem to be consistent with the general
complaint about how eminent domain is used relatively more in lowincome areas than in high-income areas. We find that an increase of
1% of the unemployment rate raises the probability o f a state response
by 4% and that an increase of 1% o f the poverty rate raises it by 1.8%.
This relates to the fact that the probability of condemnation is usually
seen as higher in areas where economic development is needed.
Another important component of our research was to analyze the
effect of the potential veto overrule by the governor of a specific state
or whether or not the response to Kelo resulted from a citizen initiative
within the state. Even if the amount of data is fairly small (one veto
overrule and seventeen citizen initiatives), we find that the state grade
still has a negative effect on the change in the HPI, at -0.83 and that
these variables have an insignificant effect. It may be due to the small
sample effect in our data of these variables.
D.

Discussion and Implications

The empirical results suggest that Kelo had a negative effect on
the change in house prices. The expected decrease of one point of the
change in the HPI due to Kelo’s information flare-up is fairly
consistent with the low probability of seizure happening overall in the
states. This result is consistent with our condemnation risk discount
theory. Kelo caused an increase in condemnation risk discounts and,
therefore, a decrease in fair market value. During this period, home
owners anticipated that the likelihood of condemnation increased and
updated their condemnation risk discounts at a higher level to provide
themselves greater intertemporal price transfers.
Given that the overall effect of Kelo is negative, it suggests two
possible underlying mechanisms within the relevant real estate market.
Kelo may have caused a negative effect on fair market value if the
market interpreted eminent domain as an inefficiently exercised tool.
Even if the market interpreted eminent domain as positive or neutral,
such that Kelo caused an increase in fair market value, we argue that
those effects were outweighed by the impact on condemnation risk
discounts.
Turning now to the state responses, the effect of the response to
Kelo by the states on market price can be understood as the sum of
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both the negative effect of the condemnation risk discount and the
relevant real estate market on the change in house prices. Our analysis
yields the interesting result that states’ legislative reactions against
Kelo may have lurther decreased the change in prices of the houses for
states with the strongest laws. It makes intuitive sense that those states
with the strongest protection against private transfer experienced the
greatest decrease in house prices.
Strong anti-Kelo legislation
constrained local governments from making improvements to the
relevant real estate market in the face of holdouts or other impediments
to organic economic development. Alternatively, states with no real
response to Kelo experienced an increase in the change in house
prices, which demonstrates that their markets integrated the potential
positive effects of private transfer via eminent domain.
Our empirical results reflect long-term effects of Kelo and state
legislation on the change in overall state house prices. As a
consequence, any short-run behavioral biases— notably the ambiguity
or belief biases previously identified—are smoothed out of the market
for purposes of our discussion.134
Having empirically shown the market’s sensitivity to the
likelihood of condemnation for private transfer, we recommend that
the market failures identified in this Article be corrected through
improved information. Specifically, state and local governments
should make readily available data on the usage of eminent domain for
private transfer. Such data will allow home owners to estimate more
accurately the likelihood of condemnation, thereby avoiding reliance
on the weak information provided by news coverage and changing
legislation. Though more challenging, further research should be done
into the marginal effect of eminent domain on large-scale redevelop
ment projects. Despite the highly politicized nature of the topic, the
market would benefit from clarity on whether eminent domain
increases the likelihood of successful large-scale redevelopment
projects.
V.

C o n c l u s io n

Justice O’Connor’s fear that the “specter of condemnation hangs
over all property” has been empirically shown. State and local
governments are encouraged to correct for the market failures that
134. Even in the short run, we expect similar results despite the existence o f ambiguity
or belief biases. Those biases may create modest short-run fluctuations consistent with our
results. In essence, the markets still clear, but at a price that reflects those biases.
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have been caused by the housing market’s lack of reliable information
about the usage and efficiency of eminent domain. Not only will such
information assuage the fear of many opponents of eminent domain
that private transfers are susceptible to poor planning and corruption,
but it will also help stabilize the housing market in response to
potential legislative and judicial changes in the future.

Copyright of Tulane Law Review is the property of Tulane Law Review and its content may
not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.

